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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit made headlines,' upholding a nationwide preliminary injunction against
implementation of the Obama Administration's controversial Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans ("DAPA") program. 2 Almost exactly a year earlier, the
* J.D. 2016, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Judge Brett Kavanaugh and Professor
Laurence Tribe for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also express my deepest
appreciation to the editorial staff of the West Virginia Law Review for their extensive work in
improving this piece and preparing it for publication. Finally, I thank Shayna Sehayik for edits,
commentary, and unconditional support on this project and everything else.
1 See, e.g., Cristian Farias, Appeals Court Upholds Delay of Obama's Executive Action On
Immigration, HUFFPosT: POL. (Nov. 9, 2015, 8:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dapa-appeals-court_564145d0e4b0b24aee4b9abl; Matt
Ford, A Ruling Against the Obama Administration On Immigration, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/1 1/fifth-circuit-obama-inumigration/415077/;
Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Energy and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/judicial-energy-and-the-supreme-court.html
(criticizing the Fifth Circuit's decision).
2 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") created DAPA while simultaneously
expanding3 a preexisting program called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
("DACA").4 DHS initiated DACA in 2012, permitting certain individuals, who
came to the United States as children and were raised here, to apply for "deferred
action"' and employment authorization.6 In a 2014 memorandum, DHS launched
DAPA, which similarly extends consideration for deferred action to
"'individuals who .. . have, [as of November 20, 2014], a son or daughter who
is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident' and meet five additional criteria."'
In response to this 2014 memorandum, 26 states sued the United States
government and DHS officials (hereinafter "United States") in federal district
court, arguing that the program violated the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") and the Take Care Clause' of the Constitution.' In February 2015,
Judge Hanen of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against DAPA and the 2014
Id. at 146-48. In a 2014 memorandum, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol ("USCBP")
to expand DACA by (1) removing the "age cap," which previously excluded individuals born
before June 15, 1981; (2) "extend[ing] DACA renewal and work authorization to three-years"; and
(3) adjusting the "date-of-entry requirement" from June 15, 2007, to January 1, 2010. U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO
CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE
THE PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter 2014
DAPA MEMO],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memodeferredaction.pdf.
4 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146-48 (5th Cir. 2015).
s DHS defines "deferred action" as "a long-standing administrative mechanism dating back
decades, by which the Secretary of Homeland Security may defer the removal of an undocumented
immigrant for a period of time." See 2014 DAPA MEMO, supra note 3, at 2.
6 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 147 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F.
Supp. 3d 591, 606 (S.D. Tex. 2015); 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction.
7 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 147 (5th Cir. 2015). According to the 2014 DAPA
Memo, individuals may be considered for deferred action under DAPA if they:
[1] have, on [November 20, 2014], a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident; [2] have continuously resided in the United States
since before January 1, 2010; [3] are physically present in the United States on
[November 20, 2014], and at the time of making a request for consideration of
deferred action with USCIS; [4] have no lawful status on [November 20,
2014]; [5] are not an enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20,
2014 Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented
Immigrants Memorandum; and [6] present no other factors that, in the exercise
of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate.
Id. at n. 12 (quoting 2014 DAPA MEMO, supra note 3).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (stating that the President "shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed").
9 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
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expansion of DACA.'o The district court held that Texas had standing to
challenge DAPA and that DHS violated the APA's procedural requirements
because DAPA was a "substantive" rule that did not undergo the requisite notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures."I
The United States appealed,12 and a divided Fifth Circuit panel affirmed,
upholding the preliminary injunction against DAPA.1 3 The court of appeals
agreed with the lower court that Texas had standing to challenge DAPA and that
DAPA is a substantive rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment
requirements.' 4 The Fifth Circuit's decision, however, is notably broader than
the district court's decision below. " In addition to this procedural APA violation,
the Fifth Circuit also held that DAPA is "manifestly contrary" to the Immigration
and Naturalization Act ("INA") and is thus substantively unlawful agency action
under section 706(2) of the APA.1 6
The Solicitor General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court17 in an effort to salvage the Administration's key
immigration initiative before the end of President Obama's final term.'" The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and instructed the parties to address the
question "[w]hether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution, Art. II, § 3."l9 An equally divided Court ultimately affirmed the
10 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d. 591, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The preliminary
injunction did not affect the aspects of DACA that predated the 2014 DAPA Memorandum.
" Id. at 643-44, 671.
12 In addition to appealing the district court's decision, the United States filed an Emergency
Motion to Stay the district court's preliminary injunction, which Judge Hanen denied. Texas v.
United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 1540022, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015). On May 26,
2015, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the stay. Texas v.
United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
13 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015).
14 Id. at 168.
1s Id. at 178.
1 Id. at 186. In the Fifth Circuit, "alternative holdings are binding precedent and not obiter
dictum." Id. at 178 n.158 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court
specifically declined to reach the plaintiffs' substantive APA claim. See Texas v. United States, 86
F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) ("In this order, the Court is specifically not addressing
Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their substantive APA claim or their constitutional claims under
the Take Care Clause/separation of powers doctrine.").
17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No.
15-674).
18 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 1.
19 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016) (mem.).
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Fifth Circuit,2 0 leaving the nationwide injunction in place and the Take Care
Clause issue ultimately unresolved.2 1
In spite of its protracted procedural history, politically contentious
nature, and non-precedential d6nouement, the Texas v. United StateS22 litigation
made a valuable and perhaps previously unforeseen contribution to our
understanding of the constitutional separation of powers, independent of the
formal outcome of the case. 23 The states' challenge to DACA and DAPA brought
renewed public and scholarly attention 24 to an otherwise under-theorized aspect
of the separation of powers: executive branch enforcement discretion.2 5
20 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272, reh'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016).
21 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-
immigration-obama-dapa.html. In 2017, President Trump revoked DAPA. See Josh Gerstein,
Trump Won't Alter Status of Current Dreamers, POLITICO (June 15, 2017, 11:06 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/15/trump-imnmigration-dreamers-status-23962 1.
22 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
23 Other cases challenging DACA have similarly contributed to the increased public and
academic salience of the constitutional issues surrounding executive enforcement discretion,
including Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 255 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal for lack of
standing of DACA challenge brought by states and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
agents), and Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affinning dismissal for lack of
standing in challenge to DACA and DAPA brought by county sheriff).
24 Although the Texas v. United States litigation deals only with DAPA and the 2014
expansion of DACA, scholars have also previously raised questions about the constitutionality of
DACA as it stood in 2012. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 850 (2013) [hereinafter Delahunty & Yoo] (arguing DACA is an
"unexcused, and perhaps unconstitutional, breach of the Executive's duty to enforce"). Throughout
the rest of this paper, for the sake of convenience, the Author will use the term "DACA/DAPA" to
refer broadly to deferred action in the context of immigration, including both the 2012 and 2014
versions of DACA and DAPA. The constitutional analysis under the Take Care Clause should not
differ between these three aspects of the Administration's nonenforcement policy in the
immigration context.
25 Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112
MICH. L. REv. 1195, 1200-01 (2014) (claiming scholarship on presidential inaction is
"undertheorized" and identifying some explanatory gaps in the literature); Mark Jia, Immigration
Law-Office ofLegal Counsel Issues Opinion Endorsing President Obama's Executive Order on
Deferred Action for Parental Accountability.-The Department of Homeland Security's Authority
to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer
Removal ofOthers, 38 OP. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014), 128 HARv. L. REV. 2320, 2320 (2015) ("Recent
executive actions on drugs, healthcare, and immigration have refocused public attention on an
important but unsettled legal issue: the scope of the President's enforcement discretion."); Zachary
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 673 (2014)
[hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion] (describing "constitutional underpinnings" of
executive enforcement discretion as "surprisingly unclear"); Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement
as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1571, 1611 (2016) [hereinafter Price, Law
Enforcement] (describing case law as "confused" and noting renewed political importance of
executive nonenforcement).
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Although both the district court26 and the court of appeals 27 in Texas declined to
reach the states' constitutional argument that DAPA violated the President's duty
to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed," President Obama's use of
nonenforcement to promote policy goals 28 prompted scholars to dedicate careful
and searching attention to the constitutional puzzles posed by exercises of
executive enforcement discretion.29 Particularly in the context of DACA/DAPA,
commentators have vigorously disagreed about whether executive
nonenforcement violates the Take Care Clause.30
Indeed, this increase in the quantity and quality of scholarly commentary
on the constitutionality of DACA/DAPA, and executive enforcement discretion
more broadly, continues to play a crucial role in the national political discourse,
despite the Court's summary affirmance in Texas. President Trump has
expressed equivocal (and at times, inconsistent) views on DACA, which initially
remained in force in the wake of the Texas decision. Ultimately, in September
2017, President Trump announced his decision to end the DACA program,
sparking a new wave of litigation based on the APA and the Equal Protection
26 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) ("In this order, the Court
is specifically not addressing Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their substantive APA claim or
their constitutional claims under the Take Care Clause/separation of powers doctrine.") (emphasis
in original).
27 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) ("We find it unnecessary, at
this early stage of the proceedings, to address or decide the challenge based on the Take Care
Clause.").
28 Both Republican and Democratic presidents have used enforcement discretion to forward
their preferred policy objectives. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Politics ofNonenforcement, 65 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1136 (2015) [hereinafter Price, Politics] (noting aggressive use of "policy-
driven nonenforcement" by Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush and arguing that Obama has
"continued the trend"). Perhaps the increased scholarly salience of nonenforcement during the
Obama administration is traceable to the President's decision to "publicly [announce]
nonenforcement policies on high-profile issues and [claim] credit for them to a degree earlier
presidents did not." Id. In addition to DAPA and DACA, the Obama Administration has also
controversially employed enforcement discretion to "abstain[] from investigating and prosecuting
certain federal marijuana offenses in states where possession of the drug is legal and [to delay] for
substantial periods the enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")." Price,
Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 673.
29 See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Reverse Nullification and Executive Discretion, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1283, 1284 n.3 (2015) (identifying numerous recent normative defenses of executive
enforcement discretion).
30 Compare Lauren Gilbert, Obama's Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence
ofImmigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 255, 284 (2013), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REv. 115, 116 (2013) [hereinafter
Nonenforcement Power], and Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action,
and the Dream Act, 91 TEX. L. REv. 59, 60 (2013), with Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration's
Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 64 (2015), and Delahunty & Yoo,
supra note 24, at 850, and Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 759-60.
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Clause rather than separation of powers principles. 31 Nonetheless, separation-of-
powers arguments remain at the forefront of the debate of DACA: threats by 10
Republican state Attorneys General to sue unless the President revoked the
program were likely critical in prompting him to do so, and United States
Attorney General Jeff Sessions characterized DACA as "unconstitutional" in
announcing its demise.32
This Article aims to bring some analytical clarity to the separation-of-
powers aspect of this multifaceted constitutional debate by suggesting the
usefulness of a familiar heuristic tool: Justice Jackson's famous tripartite
Youngstown33 framework. While at least one scholar has attempted a cursory
application of Youngstown to both DACA 34 and DAPA,35 the relative absence in
the DACA/DAPA debate of this otherwise pervasive separation-of-powers
precedent is somewhat surprising.36 The failure to rigorously apply Youngstown
31 Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on
Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-
immigration.html?mcubz-0; Tal Kopan, Blue States Sue Trump Over DACA, CNN POL. (Sept. 6,
2017, 7:07 PM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/06/politics/daca-trump-states-
lawsuits/index.html.
32 Jonathan Blitzer, Republican States Want the White House to Stop Protecting Dreamers,
NEW YORKER (July 15, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/republican-states-
want-the-trump-white-house-to-stop-protecting-dreamers; Emily Tillet, Jeff Sessions Announces
DACA Program to be Rescinded, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017, 3:10 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-daca-decision-jeff-sessions-press-briefing-live-updates/.
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
34 Peter Margulies, Taking Care oflmmigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REv. 105, 124-26 (2014) [hereinafter
Margulies, Taking Care] (placing DACA's use of prosecutorial discretion in Category 3 and
arguing that prosecutorial discretion rationale is not sufficient to support constitutionality of
DACA).
3 Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful
Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. REv. 1183, 1252-55 (2015) [hereinafter Margulies,
Boundaries] (placing DAPA in Category 3).
36 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (applying Jackson's Youngstown
concurrence for majority of the Court); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2083 (2015) ("In considering claims of Presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson's
familiar tripartite framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-
38 (1952) (concurring opinion)"). But see Gilbert, supra note 30, at 277-82 (applying Youngstown
to DACA more effectively and rigorously than Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 124-26);
Brief for Appellees, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238), 2015
WL 2157465, at *50 ("The Executive's attempt to confer lawful presence by fiat is in
Youngstown's third category. . ."). The Appellants did not cite Youngstown in any of their
appellate briefs before the Fifth Circuit.
Other scholars who have attempted to apply Youngstown to the problem of executive enforcement
discretion have failed to consider whether the Constitution endows the Executive with a positive,
[Vol. 120136
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has contributed to some confusion in the academic discourse. By bringing the
Youngstown framework to bear on the puzzle of executive enforcement
discretion, this Article will provide a common vocabulary within which
commentators can debate the constitutionality of presidential nonenforcement in
particular contexts.
This Article argues that numerous constitutional provisions, including
the Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, and the Due Process
Clause,3 7 combine to create an inherent executive prosecutorial discretion in civil
inherent power of enforcement discretion. See Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction,
95 N.C. L. REv. 553, 557-58 (2017) (examining the questions of permissible executive action and
inaction in terms of Youngstown's framework, but failing to consider whether the executive
enforcement discretion is inherent to the Constitution's structure, and instead focusing on whether
Congress and the President share power over particular substantive areas of law, such as war
powers, or the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign relations). This leads Campbell to
mistakenly focus exclusively on "the structure of the law[s] written by Congress" in trying to derive
a "principle . . . to distinguish permissible executive discretion" from impermissible exercises of
that power. See id. at 570. This approach, however, wholly omits an important part of the analysis:
whether the President may retain some inherent constitutional authority, in certain circumstances,
to under-enforce Congress's laws.
Peter Markowitz has made an important contribution in helping to fill this gap. He has helpfully
identified the Take Care Clause, Executive Power Clause, and the Pardon Clause as the textual
sources of the Executive's enforcement discretion authority. See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial
Discretion at its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REv. 489, 514-21 (2017)
[hereinafter Markowitz, Power to Protect Liberty]; see also Daniel Stepanicich, Comment,
Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1507-08 (2016) ("These two clauses together, the Vesting Clause and the
Take Care Clause, grant the President significant authority to shape domestic policy through the
enforcement-as well as the selective nonenforcement-of the laws."). He further argues that the
Constitution's "bias" against liberty deprivation enhances the Executive's power of enforcement
discretion in certain contexts: "the dividing line between traditional administrative enforcement
proceedings and those that can potentially result in a deprivation of physical liberty can offer a
workable and well-founded constitutional limiting principle-with categorical prosecutorial
discretion power being permissible only in the latter context." Markowitz, Power to Protect
Liberty, supra note 36, at 494. This Article supplements Markowitz's useful analysis of
constitutional text and structure, see infra Part III, and then further explains how this inherent
power functions within the separation of powers by translating the question into the lexicon of
Youngstown, see infra Part IV, and applying it to the case of President Obama's deferred action
policies, see infra Part V.
37 See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (describing original understanding of due process as a
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions).
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enforcement.38 This inherent power, however, is malleable and defeasible 39
rather than fixed and absolute. Congress can either explicitly or implicitly confer
executive enforcement discretion to the constitutional maximum (Youngstown
Category 1).40 Likewise, Congress can explicitly or implicitly cabin executive
enforcement discretion, reducing it to the constitutional minimum (Youngstown
Category 3). When the Executive is faced with congressional silence, he acts in
Youngstown Category 2. In the second category's "zone of twilight,"4 1 executive
enforcement discretion is limited to the President's inherent constitutional
powers. In the context of executive enforcement discretion, however, Category
2 presents an enigmatic constitutional puzzle, as the Take Care Clause
simultaneously represents a source of inherent executive power and also a source
38 In the context of criminal prosecutions, the Pardon Clause further strengthens executive
enforcement discretion. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("[The President] shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment."). The Pardon Power is plenary and cannot be limited by Congress. See United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 141 (1871) ("President's power of pardon 'is not subject to
legislation[]' . . .that 'Congress can neither limit the effect of [the President's] pardon, nor exclude
from its exercise any class of offenders."'). Moreover, the Pardon Clause has been interpreted to
endow the President with the power of amnesty, which allows him to categorically pardon certain
groups. See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154, 155 (1871) (recognizing presidential power
to grant "universal amnesty and pardon for participation" in Civil War on behalf of Confederacy);
see also PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAw 572 (3d ed. 2011)
(stating that the pardon power includes "power to pardon specified classes or communities
wholesale") (citation omitted); William F. Duker, The Presidential Power to Pardon: A
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475, 514-19 (1977) (discussing post-Civil War
disagreement about whether pardon power included amnesty power before Court resolved the
question in Armstrong and noting that framers probably considered amnesty power "incidental to"
pardon power). The illimitability of the presidential power to grant pardon and amnesty seems to
support broader executive discretion, at least in criminal enforcement, especially given that "the
President has absolute authority to issue a pardon at any time after an unlawful act has occurred,
even before a charge or trial." See In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Ex
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (emphasis in original)).
39 The concept of "defeasibility" is drawn from Price, who argues that the Constitution
authorizes executive enforcement discretion, but Congress may restrict this authority by mandating
enforcement in certain circumstances. Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 674-75.
40 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLuM. L. REV.
265, 267 (2013); see also infra note 144 and accompanying text (defending the constitutionality of
"big waiver," whereby Congress delegates to executive agencies "the power to unmake law
Congress has made rather than to make law Congress has not"). The constitutionality of "big
waiver" would suggest that executive discretion in Category 1 may be essentially boundless,
depending on the scope of congressional authorization.
41 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 120138
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of executive duty, which provides an intrinsic limit on the scope of his
enforcement discretion.42
This Article demonstrates that the Constitution endows the Executive
with inherent enforcement discretion, including the power to supervise and
prioritize law enforcement activities. Therefore, I argue that in Category 2, the
Take Care Clause does not preclude the Executive from exercising enforcement
discretion, including the power to coordinate categorical enforcement priorities.
Finally, even in Category 3, I argue that the President's inherent power of
enforcement discretion ensures that he always retains at least some discretion to
decline enforcement in individual cases, especially in the criminal context.
Furthermore, in light of the powers concomitant to his "constitutional duty to
supervise," including the power to coordinate and prioritize enforcement, 4 3 1
argue that the President's inherent enforcement discretion power may extend
beyond individualized discretion to countenance the creation of categorical civil
enforcement priorities, even in Category 3.
By translating the enforcement discretion debate into the lexicon of
Youngstown, this Article synthesizes and evaluates several arguments for and
against the constitutionality of DACA/DAPA. The application of the
Youngstown framework reinforces the importance of statutory interpretation:
depending on how Congress's instructions, either explicit or implicit, are
interpreted, DACA/DAPA might be in either Category 1, 2, or 3.44 Ultimately,
this Article concludes that the program represents a constitutionally permissible
exercise of executive enforcement discretion, best located within Category 2 of
Jackson's triptych.45 Part II briefly reviews the landscape of recent literature on
42 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 688 ("At least insofar as 'the Laws' are
acts of Congress, this take care duty implies a principle of legislative supremacy in lawmaking: the
President's duty is to ensure execution of Congress's laws, not to make up the law on his own.").
43 See Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031, 1037(2013); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1929(2015).
4 But see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 186,(5th Cir. 2015) (holding DAPA contrary
to mandate of INA); Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 122 (eliminating Category 1 for
DACA); Margulies, Boundaries, supra note 35, at 1252-53 (eliminating Categories 1 and 2 for
DAPA); Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 760 (claiming "no statute specifically
authorizes the status-'deferred action'-conferred on immigrants under the policy").
45 It is worth noting that Youngstown's categorical framework, despite its heuristic utility, is
not dispositive of the constitutional inquiry. Even if DACA/DAPA is properly placed in Category
3, where presidential authority is at its lowest ebb, the Executive's action might still be authorized
as an exercise of exclusive and preclusive power. Cf Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135
S. Ct. 2076, 2095-96 (placing Presidential contravention of Section 214(d) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act in Category 3 but holding Presidential exclusive power over formal
recognition of foreign sovereigns "disables Congress from acting"); Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II
as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARv. L. REv. 112, 114 (2015) (agreeing with Chief
Justice Roberts, in dissent, that Zivotofsky upheld, "for the first time, 'a President's direct defiance
of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs'); see generally David J. Barron & Martin S.
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executive enforcement discretion, translating the different arguments into the
lexicon of Youngstown. Part III synthesizes arguments from constitutional text
to develop a theory of inherent executive enforcement discretion, couched in the
Youngstown framework. In light of this theory of inherent executive discretion,
Part IV then applies the Youngstown framework to DACA/DAPA.
II. DEBATING TH{E NATURE OF EXECUTIVE "CARE-TAKING"
The debate about the constitutionality of executive enforcement
discretion centers on conflicting interpretations of the Take Care Clause. 4
6 As
one commentator has aptly noted, there is "little consensus" among scholars as
to the historical meaning of the clause, although most scholars agree that the
clause at least prohibits the suspension and dispensation powers exercised by
English monarchs. 4 7 Beyond this shared baseline, however, there is wide
disagreement about the degree to which the Take Care Clause constrains
executive enforcement discretion: some commentators have argued that the Take
Care Clause absolutely precludes any discretionary nonenforcement,48 while
others have argued that executive enforcement discretion is not only consistent
with, but is also perhaps bolstered by, the Take Care Clause.49
The breadth of viewpoints on the relationship between the Clause and
executive enforcement discretion is partially traceable to the Supreme Court's
Janus-faced treatment of this constitutional provision as both a duty-imposing
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L.
REv. 941 (2008).
46 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas v. United States, 86 F.
Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00254), 2014 WL 6806231, at *76 (alleging that
DHS's 2014 DAPA Memo violates Take Care Clause); Cruz, supra note 30, at 74; Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 24, at 855.
47 TODD GARVEY, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE DiSCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE LAW 4-5 n.25 (2014) (citing Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 693),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43708.pdf; see also Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at
675 (characterizing "the principle that American Presidents, unlike English kings, lack authority
to suspend statutes or grant dispensations that prospectively excuse legal violations" as a "deeply
rooted constitutional tradition"). "The 'suspending power abrogated a statute across the board,
whereas the dispensing power nullified it only as to those specifically granted exemptions."'
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24 n. 135 (citations omitted).
48 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 784 ("Take Care Clause imposes on the President a
duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases.") (emphasis
in original). Delahunty and Yoo do acknowledge, however, that this duty is "defeasible," by which
they mean breaches of duty, though presumptively invalid, can be justified in certain
circumstances. Id. at 785. They offer three limited justifications for executive breaches of duty:
"unconstitutionality of the law, equity in individual cases, and resource limitations." Id. at 786.
The authors argue none of these three justifications applies to DACA. Id.
49 See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 697 ("The Take Care Clause itself may
also support an inference of executive enforcement discretion.").
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limit and a font of executive power." While cases like Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes" emphasize the presidential duty to enforce the laws, the Court has
also recently held that the President's "take care" obligations necessarily
contemplate implicit powers to oversee enforcement.52 In light of these
inherently conflicting impulses within the Clause itself, it is unsurprising that
commentators disagree about the existence and scope of the Executive's
enforcement discretion. This Section will describe the scholarly dissonance, and
in the process will attempt to bring consonance, if not harmonious resolution, to
the debate by translating the various positions into the common vocabulary of
the familiar Youngstown framework.
A. "Take Care" as Binding Obligation
Professors Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo have offered the most
robust conception of the Take Care Clause as a duty-imposing constraint on
executive power.53 In the context of attacking the legality of DACA, these
authors argue that "the Constitution's Take Care Clause imposes on the President
a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and
cases." 5 4 As a necessary corollary to this position, Delahunty and Yoo claim
"there is simply no general presidential nonenforcement power."s5 They reach
their conclusion, in part, by appealing to original semantic understanding56 and
drafting history at the Philadelphia Convention." Furthermore, Delahunty and
Yoo expand on the consensus view that the Take Care Clause was intended to
50 See GARVEY, supra note 47, at 3 ("The Take Care Clause would appear to stand for two, at
times diametrically opposed propositions-one imposing a 'duty' upon the President and the other
viewing the Clause as a source of Presidential 'power."').
51 Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 525 (1838) ("To contend that the
obligations imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid
their execution; is a novel construction of the constitution, and is entirely inadmissible."); see also
GARVEY, supra note 47 n. 16 (collecting cases where courts espouse view of presidential duty under
Take Care Clause).
52 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010)
(holding multilevel removal protections for subordinate executive officers "contravenes the
President's 'constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws."') (citation
omitted); see also GARVEY, supra note 47 n. 17 (collecting cases).
5 See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24.
54 Id. at 784.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 799 (examining Founding Era dictionary and concluding the Take Care Clause is
"naturally read as an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at least
to see that they are put into effect, 'without failure' and 'exactly"').
57 Id. at 802 (quoting James Wilson, who introduced the original draft of the clause, as
explaining that it means "the President has 'authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the
laws, but to execute and act the laws, which [are] established").
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preclude the dispensation and suspension powers previously exercised by the
English Crown, inferring that a presidential nonenforcement power is thus
constitutionally precluded."
Delahunty and Yoo temper their otherwise rigid conception of
uncompromising executive enforcement duty by identifying several potential
"defenses" which could "justify a breach of duty."59 For example, they argue for
a strong executive prerogative to decline to enforce unconstitutional laws.60
These authors similarly identify "equity in individual cases"61 and a lack of
resources as potential defenses or excuses to an executive breach of enforcement
duty.62 Finally, although the authors do not frame it as a "defense" to an
executive "breach of duty," they posit that the executive might retain a
constitutional "prerogative" power, which "would authorize deviation from, or
even outright violation of, the law" to address a "compelling public necessity."63
Perhaps unsurprisingly,' Delahunty and Yoo argue that "if such broad executive
powers were to exist anywhere," it would be in foreign, but not domestic
affairs,6 5 and they claim that Supreme Court case law confirms this intuition. 66
Notably, they identify Youngstown as a case about "prerogative" power and
58 Id. at 808; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
5 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 835.
60 Id. at 836.
61 Id. at 841-45.
62 Id. at 845 (stating that agencies can offer insufficient resources as "an excuse: it would be
admitting to having failed in its duty but arguing that the responsibility is really that of Congress").
63 Id. at 808.
6 As a Deputy Assistant Attorney General during the Bush Administration, John C. Yoo
notoriously "wrote a series of memoranda in support of the President's unfettered 'Commander-
in-Chief authority during times of war." Wadhia, supra note 30 n.8. The most "infamous" of these
memoranda is now known as the "torture memo," in which Yoo argued for "the President's
authority to seize, detain, and interrogate enemy combatants." Id. Yoo has publically defended the
consistency of his broad view of executive war powers with his more narrow view of executive
power in the DACA context:
There is a world of difference between putting aside laws that interfere with
an executive response to an attack on the country, as in Sept. 11, 2001, and
ignoring laws to appeal to a constituency vital to re-election .... The former
recognizes the president's primary duty to protect the national security. The
latter, unfortunately, represents a twisting of the Constitution's fabric for
partisan ends.
Id. (quoting Elise Foley, John Yoo, "Torture Memo" Author, Says Obama Violated Constitution
with Deferred Action Policy, HUFFPOST (Oct. 15, 2012, 11:19 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/15/john-yoo-obama-defferedaction-n_1966955.html).
65 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 826.
66 Id. at 828.
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claim that DACA "was more clearly contrary to Congress's will than President
Truman's seizure of the steel mills."6 7
To summarize their position in terms of Youngstown's framework,
Delahunty and Yoo seem to assume that the President acts in Category 3
whenever he exercises enforcement discretion. Through certain "defenses," they
carve out a space where prosecutorial discretion is constitutionally authorized in
Category 3, namely: (1) when the Executive declines to enforce a law he believes
is unconstitutional; and (2) when he declines to enforce a law in consideration of
"equity in individual cases."68 From their perspective, Category 2's "zone of
twilight, in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority" 69
is a null set in the enforcement discretion context: the President simply has no
inherent "independent powers" to decline enforcement.71 Similarly, the
Delahunty and Yoo position seems to ignore the possibility of nonenforcement
in Category 1, where the President declines to enforce a law "pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress."7 1 With respect to DACA, these
authors (contestably) interpret the INA's text to simply preclude anything more
than individualized enforcement discretion. They concede, however, that a "de
facto delegation"7 2 theory "provides the best defense .. .for the Administration's
nonenforcement decision," 73 and thus implicitly recognize the possibility that the
President may sometimes act in Category 1, with at least implied congressional
authorization, in declining to enforce laws.
B. "Take Care" as Defeasible and Limited Duty
Professor Zachary Price criticizes the Delahunty and Yoo approach as
"too rigid" in light of "countervailing considerations that support a presumption
of case-by-case enforcement discretion" and "the history of federal law-
67 Id. at 829, 835.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
69 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
70 Compare id., with supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
71 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
72 In a seminal article, Professors Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodriguez coined the term
"de facto delegation," arguing that Congress's "detailed" immigration "code has had the
counterintuitive consequence of delegating tremendous authority to the President to set
immigration screening policy by making a huge fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of
the Executive." Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 463 (2009). They theorize that Congress de facto delegated immigration authority
in two ways: (1) through "radical expansion of the grounds of deportation[,] ... render[ing] a large
fraction of legal immigrants deportable"; and (2) through a "combination of stringent admissions
restrictions ... and lax border enforcement policy by the Executive," giving the Executive
"primary control over a large unauthorized population within the United States." Id.
73 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 851-53.
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enforcement practice."7 4 Price thus offers an alternative constitutional
framework, arguing for some notion of inherent executive nonenforcement
authority." He identifies two competing constitutional principles that govern the
scope of executive enforcement discretion. First, from the Take Care Clause,
Price derives a principle of "legislative supremacy": "At least insofar as 'the
Laws' are acts of Congress, this take care duty implies a principle of legislative
supremacy in lawmaking: the President's duty is to ensure execution of
Congress's laws, not to make up the law on his own." 76 Yet unlike Delahunty
and Yoo, Price accounts for other aspects of the Constitution's text and structure,
such as the "separation of executive and legislative functions" and the
executive's "exclusive responsibility for law enforcement" to derive a second,
dueling principle of "executive enforcement discretion."77 These two principles,
legislative supremacy and executive discretion, anchor Price's suggested
constitutional framework for analyzing the permissibility of executive
enforcement discretion.
He theorizes the existence of a limited, but constitutionally inherent,
power of executive enforcement discretion, based on the executive discretion
principle. He conceptualizes the enforcement discretion power and its limits as a
set of "dual presumptions," rooted in the "countervailing principles" of
legislative supremacy and executive discretion. First, executive discretion to
"decline[] enforcement in particular cases" must be considered presumptively
valid.7 9 Yet this discretion is limited by a second presumption, rooted in the
principle of legislative supremacy: "Notwithstanding their case-by-case
discretion, executive officials lack inherent authority either to prospectively
license statutory violations or to categorically suspend enforcement of statutes
for policy reasons."80 According to Price, "[t]hese two presumptions strike a
balance that best resolves a deep conflict within the constitutional scheme of
separated legislative and executive powers."8
Although the Youngstown framework is all but absent82 from Price's
framework, recourse to the familiar categorical heuristic is helpful in illustrating
the interaction of these competing presumptions in practice. Price's key insight
74 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 688-89.
7 Id. at 688.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 688, 696.
7 Id. at 704.
79 Id.
80 Id. (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 675.
82 Price cites Youngstown just once, for the proposition that "[t]he Constitution limits [the
President's] functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Id. at 690 n.62.
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is that the executive presumptively retains some inherent enforcement discretion,
but this "baseline nonenforcement authority is defeasible: Congress may restrict
it by mandating enforcement in specified circumstances."8 3 In Price's view,
Congress can place executive enforcement discretion in Category 3 by
"enact[ing] enforcement guidelines or even statutory mandates requiring
enforcement in specified circumstances."84 By extension, unless an exercise of
enforcement discretion contravenes the "expressed or implied will of Congress,"
the Executive acts within the second Youngstown category when he declines to
enforce the law in individual cases, and his nonenforcement decisions are
presumptively valid." Yet Price's "countervailing presumption" also provides
an upper limit on the President's inherent nonenforcement power in Category 2:
"The executive branch thus exceeds its proper role, and enters the legislature's
domain, if without proper congressional authorization it uses enforcement
discretion to categorically suspend enforcement or to license particular
violations." 86 Finally, when Price explains that the presumption of legislative
supremacy is likewise defeasible, permitting "Congress to authorize at least
some forms of executive suspending or dispensing authority," he theorizes the
nearly limitless authority of Executive discretion in Category 1.87
III. EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION IN YOUNGSTOWN
As the above analysis of the academic literature has demonstrated, the
Youngstown framework brings useful analytical clarity to the controversial issue
of executive enforcement discretion by providing a common lexicon in which to
debate, if not resolve, the constitutional question. Delahunty and Yoo's
restrictive approach to enforcement discretion denies the existence of Category
2 and allows for no inherent executive power to support discretion in Category
3, subject to narrow, specifically enumerated exceptions." Price's account, in
contrast, allows for a limited and defeasible inherent Presidential
nonenforcement power: this baseline power can support some enforcement
discretion in Category 2, which Congress can either expand or contract by
statute.
8 Id. at 675.
84 Id. at 707. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.").
85 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
86 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 676.
87 Id. at 707. Cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring); Barron & Rakoff,
supra note 40, at 313-15 (defending constitutionality of "big waiver" and distinguishing it from
the unconstitutional line-item veto act).
88 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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This Section agrees with Price's basic constitutional framework, which
posits the existence of some inherent executive enforcement discretion that may
span the Youngstown spectrum, depending on the statutory context. This Section
supplements Price's account and sharpens its contours, by mounting a textual
and normative89 argument that the Executive always retains an irreducible and
inherent constitutional minimum of enforcement discretion, even in Category 3.
From this perspective, while Price's presumption of legislative supremacy may
be completely defeasible in Category 1,90 there is a constitutional floor on the
defeasibility of the competing principle of enforcement discretion in Category 3.
In other words, even if "the express or implied will of Congress" places particular
exercises of executive discretion in Category 3, the Executive might still prevail
on the force of his "conclusive and preclusive" powers of enforcement
discretion. 91
While commentators seem to agree that the Take Care Clause provides
at least some limit on executive enforcement discretion, 9 2 the textual grounding
for a positive theory of executive enforcement discretion is less well-developed.
In a recent opinion for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
Judge Kavanagh has identified several constitutional provisions in Article II that
combine to endow the Executive with enforcement discretion, "including the
Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Oath of Office Clause, and
the Pardon Clause." 93 Moreover, in agreement with Price, Judge Kavanaugh
89 It is worth noting that historical practice also favors a broad conception of executive
enforcement discretion. Although historical executive practice alone "does not, by itself, create
power," Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 184 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 532 (2008)). "[Tlhe longstanding 'practice of the government' can inform our
determination of 'what the law is."' Id. at n.193 (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014)). Because of space constraints and given that Price has
already demonstrated that "[o]ver the course of American history, the basic trajectory of federal
law has been towards increasing executive discretion, in both criminal and administrative law,"
this paper declines to canvas historical practice in support of an inherent executive enforcement
discretion power. Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 717; see also GARVEY, supra
note 47, at 11 (noting "long historical pedigree" of prosecutorial discretion and tracing it to the
"Sixteenth Century English common law procedural mechanism" of nolle prosequi); Wadhia,
supra note 30, at 60 ("[F]ar from being a new policy that undercuts statutory law, prosecutorial
discretion actions like DACA have been pursued by other presidents and part of the immigration
system for at least thirty-five years."); Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Clinical Professor
of Law, Pa. State Sch. of Law, et. al, to President Barack Obama (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/ file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf.
9 See supra note 87.
91 Cf Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015) (upholding
Presidential action in Category 3); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
92 See supra text accompanying notes 46, 54, and 76.
93 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1
(Executive Power Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (Oath of Office Clause); U.S. CONST art.
II, § 2, cl. 1 (Pardon Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (Take Care Clause).
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suggests that the Bill of Attainder Clause 94 supports a structural inference of
executive discretion in enforcement, 95 perhaps especially on an individualized
basis. Because Price has already explained how the Oath of Office Clause, 96 the
Pardon Clause, 9 7 and the Bill of Attainder Clause9 8 support a presumption of
Executive enforcement discretion, this Section focuses on the constitutional
provisions to which Price dedicates little or no attention but which nonetheless
support inherent executive enforcement discretion: the Executive Power Clause,
the Take Care Clause, and the Due Process Clause. 99
A. The Executive Power Clause
Article II of the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America."" Although the precise
contours of "executive power" are unclear, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that "[t]he vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws.""o' Whatever else this "grant
of power" may entail, it must include, at the very least, the power to enforce the
laws and to supervise law enforcement by executive subordinates. 102 In fact,
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
95 In reAiken Cty., 725 F.3d at 262; Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 697 ("By
precluding laws that impose punishment without executive or judicial action, the Bill of Attainder
Clause ensures that punitive legislation will carry some degree of generality, leaving to the
Executive identification of individual violators for punishment.").
96 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 698 (The Oath Clause "suggests that proper
performance of the executive function may require adherence to notions of justice, equity, and the
public interest, even at the expense of complete enforcement of each and every statutory
mandate.").
97 Id. (noting the Pardon Clause "may also imply some degree of enforcement discretion, at
least in the criminal context.").
9 See supra note 95.
9 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
101 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). See also SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 38,
at 523 (claiming "clearest authority" for the law-enforcement conception of the Executive found
in Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890)); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Taxonomy of
Presidential Powers, 88 B.U. L. REv. 327, 332 (2008) (discussing "vesting clause powers" but
acknowledging that some scholars deny that Vesting Clause "actually grants anything").
102 See Andrias, supra note 43, at 1046 ("If the Vesting Clause bestows any affirmative power
in the President, it must include the authority to supervise enforcement."); see also KATE M.
MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL
ISSUES n.46 (2013), file:///C:/Users/jprhea/Downloads/nps68-012114-23%20(2).pdf ("[T]he
executive branch has asserted that 'because the essential core of the President's constitutional
responsibility is the duty to enforce the laws, the Executive Branch has exclusive authority to
initiate and prosecute actions to enforce the laws adopted by Congress."') (citing U.S. Atty.
General, Opinion Letter on Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official
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several scholars have characterized the "law enforcement" power as necessarily
contained in even a "narrow 'dictionary' conception of Executive power.""o'
Although the Supreme Court has not commented directly on the nature of the
Executive's law enforcement power, Professor Kate Andrias has also derived
from several cases, including the "removal cases," the principle that
"enforcement authority lies at the core of the President's power."l04
The Executive's inherently-authorized enforcement discretion is a
necessary incident of the law enforcement power vested by the Executive Power
Clause. Supreme Court precedents have recognized the ineluctable connection
between enforcement and discretion, noting that "the Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case.""o5 Significantly, the Court has recognized that this necessary discretion
extends beyond the sphere of criminal prosecutions to encompass civil
enforcement as well."o' While some scholars have broadly concluded that such
inherent executive enforcement discretion precludes only executive action
"contra legem," others have suggested the President may only constitutionally
"use[] enforcement discretion and prioritization-including nonenforcement-
to advance policy goals" if he can articulate a reasonable basis in statutory law
Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege (May 30, 1984)); Saikrishna Prakash, The
Essential Meaning ofExecutive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 701, 704 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash,
Essential Meaning] (identifying "essential, original meaning of the executive power" and
"highlight[ing] the president's centrality in federal law enforcement").
103 Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power ofthe Presidency, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993)
(citing HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE 2-4 (1989)); see also Prakash, Essential
Meaning, supra note 102, at 713.
10 Andrias, supra note 43, at 1048; see id. at n.63 (discussing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926) and Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)); id. at n.66 (discussing
majority and dissenting opinions in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)); id. at 1049-50
(arguing that Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010), makes
clear that permissibility of removal restrictions turns "at least in part, on whether an agency
exercises enforcement authority").
105 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citations omitted). See also United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (describing prosecution as "special province" of Executive
and noting that Executive-branch prosecutors have "broad discretion to enforce nation's criminal
laws") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 2013); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE
L.J. 2280, 2293 (2006) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 489 (1999)) (stating that prosecutorial discretion is the "special province" of the Executive).
106 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) ("Removal is a civil, not
criminal, matter. A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials."); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("[An agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.") (citations omitted); Goldsmith &
Manning, supra note 105, at 2294 (noting "similar principles" of discretion apply in "civil
context").
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to the public and Congress. 10 7 Either way, practicality'os and precedent compel
recognition of inherent executive enforcement discretion, derived in part from
the Executive Power Clause.1 09
B. The Take Care Clause
Like the Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause also represents
a textual source of inherent executive enforcement discretion. Recall that the
Take Care Clause bears a Janus-faced relationship to Executive Power,
simultaneously creating obligations and bestowing power.1 10 Price has
acknowledged the Clause's dual nature, noting that while "[a]s a general
matter ... this clause codifies a principle of executive subordination to law," it
may simultaneously also "support an inference of executive enforcement
discretion.""' He locates the generative force of the Take Care Clause in the
word "faithfully," which he reads to suggest (in both the Take Care Clause and
the Oath Clause) "that proper performance of the executive function may require
adherence to notions of justice, equity, and the public interest, even at the
expense of complete enforcement of each and every statutory mandate."112 While
this inquiry into the meaning of faithful execution is a useful starting point, it is
an incomplete account of the relationship between the Take Care Clause and the
Executive's inherent enforcement discretion power.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the Take Care Clause as
a font of substantive executive power. Most relevantly, in Heckler, the Court
explicitly tied the notion of enforcement discretion to the Take Care Clause,
analogizing agency non-enforcement discretion to prosecutorial discretion: both
are the "special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive
who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
107 Compare Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 105, at 2309 ("[T]he completion power does
not permit the President to act contra legem."), with Andrias, supra note 43, at 1039.
108 Andrias, supra note 43, at 1045 ("[E]ven when legislation circumscribes enforcement
discretion, the Executive must continue to make countless policy determinations about how best
to enforce other parts of the statutes or to prioritize among various statutory programs.").
109 But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 799-800 (briefly attempting to rebut idea that
Executive Power Clause vests any nonenforcement authority in Executive). Delahunty and Yoo's
argument relies on the questionable assumption that the Take Care Clause "dispels" any possibility
that the Executive Power Clause confers independent enforcement discretion because the Take
Care Clause "requir[es] the President to ensure that the laws are executed." Id. at 800. This begs
the question by assuming that discretionary enforcement is logically inconsistent with faithful
execution. To the contrary, as Section III.B demonstrates, the Take Care Clause itself implicitly
confers a degree of enforcement discretion power in the Executive.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
III Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 697.
112 Id. at 698.
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executed.""' Moreover, relying on Heckler v. Chaney,1 1 4 the Executive Branch
itself has tied its enforcement discretion power to the Take Care Clause, noting
that "'faithful[]' execution of the law does not necessarily entail 'act[ing] against
each technical violation of the statute' that an agency is charged with
enforcing."115
The constitutional obligation to ensure faithful execution does, however,
necessarily entail some power to control, coordinate, and prioritize
enforcement.116 Consequently, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Take
Care Clause implies a presidential power to supervise subordinate officers." As
Professor Gillian Metzger has argued, the "constitutional duty to supervise ...
indicates that presidential efforts to direct nonenforcement on a categorical,
prospective, and transparent basis can have strong constitutional roots."" 8
Similarly, respect for the faithful execution duty seems to account for the Court's
deference to the "complicated balancing" process inherent in executive agencies'
"proper ordering of [enforcement] priorities.""' In this way, the Take Care
Clause also supports an inference of inherent executive enforcement discretion,
especially with respect to supervision, coordination and prioritization of law
enforcement activities. 12 0
C. The Due Process Clause
Finally, looking beyond Article II, the Due Process Clause provides
constitutional support for an inherent executive power to exercise enforcement
discretion. 12 1 Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have
113 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
114 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
11 U.S. ArrY. GENERAL, OPINION LETTER ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
AUTHORITY TO PRIORITIZE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED
STATES AND TO DEFER REMOVAL OF OTHERS 4 (Nov. 19,2014) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831),
https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download.
116 See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 43, at 1037 ("By placing him at the head of the Executive
Branch, the Constitution also positions the President to serve as coordinator and prioritizer of
overlapping and sometimes conflicting enforcement regimes."); see also Metzger, supra note 43,
at 1929 ("[B]y openly stating a generally applicable policy and then instituting an administrative
scheme to implement that policy, the President and DHS Secretaries Napolitano and Johnson were
actually fulfilling their constitutional duties to supervise.").
117 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) ("The
President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them."); see generally GARVEY, supra note 47, at 8-10.
1'8 Metzger, supra note 43, at 1929.
1" Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
120 See Andrias, supra note 43, at 1039.
121 This argument has received almost no attention in the literature on enforcement discretion.
Price, for example, raises the point parenthetically, noting that "case-specific," legislatively-
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persuasively argued that the original understanding of the due process right was
grounded in "separation-of-powers" logic. 122 They outline the evolution of the
concept of "due process of law" over a "several-hundred year period," tracing its
roots all the way back to the Magna Charta. 123 The modem conception of
separation of powers began with the application of due process against the
Executive under Stuart-Era English law: "the Crown could deprive subjects of
rights only through institutional coordination," under laws made by Parliament
and applied to individual cases by the judiciary. 124 A century or so later,
American constitutional reform replaced the Stuart-era supremacy of the
legislature "with a more definite separation of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, and the adoption of structural guarantees of judicial independence such
as life tenure and stable (and sufficient) pay."l25 According to Chapman and
McConnell, the key advancement of American constitutionalism was the
application of "the ancient idea of due process of law . .. to all government
action, including acts of the legislature."1 26 These authors focus in particular
upon the separation of the legislative and judicial power as an aspect of due
process, preventing the legislative branch from "deciding individual cases" or
"retrospectively divest[ing] a person of vested rights."'27
At a more general level, however, "[t]he basic idea of due process, both
at the Founding and at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was
that the law of the land required each branch of government to operate in a
distinctive manner, at least when the effect was to deprive a person of liberty or
property." 2 8 From this perspective, the fact that the separation of powers
precludes the legislature from enforcing the law is just as important to due
mandated enforcement decisions "might well violate due process." Price, Enforcement Discretion,
supra note 25, at 712 n.159. This paper thus contributes to the literature by developing an
affirmative case for executive enforcement discretion as an aspect of constitutionally guaranteed
due process of law.
122 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation ofPowers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1678 (2012).
123 Id. at 1679-83 ("The individual-rights implications of Magna Charta are well appreciated,
but not enough attention has been paid to their connection to the separation of powers.").
124 Id. at 1683-84; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63
STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1042 (2011) ("[T]he object of the Due Process Clause is not Congress but the
President."). Chapman and McConnell credit Sir Edward Coke in particular with application of
due process as a "limit [on] the prerogative powers of the Crown, in defense both of courts and of
an emerging parliamentary supremacy over the content of law." Chapman & McConnell, supra
note 122, at 1684. The authors also note that Coke's views were a chief source of early American
constitutionalism. Id.
125 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 122, at 1705.
126 Id. at 1717.
127 Id. at 1782.
128 Id. at 1781 (emphasis added).
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process as the prohibition on executive lawmaking.129 Because due process of
law "require[s] that government can deprive persons of rights only pursuant to a
coordinated effort of separate institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate
claims," the executive's enforcement discretion is a core protection against
government deprivations of individual rights without due process of law.
130
Although this argument that the Due Process Clause supports an
inference of executive discretion is somewhat novel," it finds resonance in
judicial analysis of executive enforcement discretion. For example, Judge
Kavanaugh has identified the "executive's broad prosecutorial discretion" as a
"key point of the Constitution's separation of powers."1 32 He explicitly connects
this "unilateral power" to exercise enforcement discretion to the enhancement of
individual liberty13 3 and to the famous Madisonian insight that "accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . .. may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."134 He also suggests that there may
be an irreducible minimum of constitutionally-required executive enforcement
discretion that Congress cannot invade or limit.135 Although Judge Kavanaugh
explicitly locates the enforcement discretion power in Article I, 136 his reasoning
also lends credence to the idea of "due process as separation of powers,"
supplying constitutional reinforcement for inherent executive enforcement
discretion. 137
129 Cf id. at 1779-82 (describing understanding of tripartite separation at Founding as an aspect
of due process and outlining powers of each branch).
130 Id. at 1672.
131 See supra note 121.
132 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
133 The Supreme Court has also recognized the clear connection between prosecutorial
discretion and individual liberty, albeit more obliquely, noting that "[d]iscretion in the enforcement
of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
396 (2012).
134 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d at 264 (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 47, at 269 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., rev. ed. 1999).
133 Id. at 263 ("In light of the President's Article II prosecutorial discretion, Congress may not
mandate that the President prosecute a certain kind of offense or offender."); id. at 264 ("After
enacting a statute, Congress may not mandate the prosecution of violators of that statute.").
136 Id. at 262-63.
137 It is also worth noting that the Due Process Clauses and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment also act as a necessary limit on the exercise of executive
discretion. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(acknowledging "possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so
outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome"); United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, 463 (1996) ("Our cases delineating the necessary elements to prove a claim of selective
prosecution have taken great pains to explain that the standard is a demanding one."); GARVEY,
supra note 47, at 13-14 (explaining exercises of discretion cannot violate individual constitutional
rights, including equal protection, but that it is difficult to maintain a suit based on "selective
prosecution"); Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 683 (noting courts have held that
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IV. MAPPING YOUNGSTOWN ONTO ExEcuTIvE ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
The text and structure of the Constitution empower the Executive to
exercise an inherent enforcement discretion power.' The historical practice of
the political branches serves to reinforce this textually-inferred power.13 9 Once
one accepts the premise that the Constitution contemplates at least some inherent
executive enforcement power to decline enforcement, the relevance of the
Youngstown triptych becomes clear. Applying the Youngstown framework
clarifies the proper relationship between Congress and President vis-A-vis
permissible enforcement discretion and highlights the importance of statutory
construction in analyzing exercises of enforcement discretion.140 This Section
synthesizes arguments from constitutional text to develop a theory of inherent
executive enforcement discretion, couched in the Youngstown framework. It
systematically analyzes DACA/DAPA under each of Youngstown's three
categories.
In Youngstown's first category, Presidential power to decline
enforcement may well be boundless. In Category 1, "the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress." 4 1 Thus, "his authority is at
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate." 42 Some scholars, including Price, conceive of
they "will not interfere with the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion unless it is abused to
such an extent as to be arbitrary and capricious and violative of due process."); see also Price,
Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 710 ("[C]onstitutional requirements of due process and
equal protection may prevent executive officials from exercising these [enforcement discretion]
powers arbitrarily.").
138 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (identifying relevant constitutional
provisions).
139 See supra note 89.
140 See, e.g., Love & Garg, supra note 25, at 1207 ("Jackson [in Youngstown] recognized that
although the Constitution divided authority among the branches, it made this authority overlapping,
thus creating interdependence."); see also id. at 1213 (noting "that Congress tends to give
discretion to the president in defined terms; statutory grants of power allow for a range of
enforcement, which entail minimum requirements (the executive 'shall' do something) and
maximum authority (the executive 'shall not' do more), as well as options in between (the president
'may' do what he wants, within the defined range)"); cf Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2326 (2001) ("That Congress could bar the President from directing
discretionary action does not mean that Congress has done so; whether it has is a matter of statutory
construction."). Notably, Love and Garg claim that Jackson's Youngstown framework "did not
address . . . whether it is constitutional for a president to choose not to act pursuant to congressional
authorization." Love & Garg, supra note 25, at 1207. Although the facts of Youngstown itself of
course dealt with unlawful Presidential action, this paper argues that when enforcement discretion
is conceptualized as inherent executive power, the Youngstown framework is again instructive in
determining the proper exercises of that power.
141 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
142 Id.
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seemingly limitless executive enforcement discretion when licensed by
Congress: "the Federal Constitution's silence on the issue readily permits the
conclusion that the laws the President must execute include laws authorizing
executive suspensions or dispensations." 14 3 Similarly, Judge David Barron and
Professor Todd Rakoff have defended the constitutionality of "big waiver,"
whereby Congress delegates to executive agencies "the power to unmake law
Congress has made rather than to make law Congress has not."'" Clinton v. City
ofNew York,' 45 which invalidated the "line-item veto," indicates that there may
be some upper limit on the permissibility of Congressional delegations of
statutory waiver. 146 Yet scholars have argued that "at least insofar as a waiver
statute" can be distinguished from the formal separation of powers violation of
the line-item veto act, "Clinton should not alter the conclusion that statutory
delegation of [even] a suspending or dispensing power to the President is
constitutionally permissible." 47
The analysis is, of course, more challenging in Jackson's latter two
categories. The above arguments in favor of an inherent executive power of
enforcement discretion prove the relevance of Jackson's second category in this
context. Category 2 applies "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority."l48 In such situations, the President
acts within a "zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." 49 Thus, the Executive "can
only rely upon his own independent powers," which notably include an
enforcement discretion power."o It is also significant that in Category 2,
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes ... enable, if
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility."s' Thus, "any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
143 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 709.
14 David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 265, 267
(2013) [hereinafter Big Waiver]; see also Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 710-11.
145 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
146 Id. at 449.
147 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 710-11. Barron and Rakoff also argue that
Clinton v. City of New York does not preclude the constitutionality of "big waiver." Big Waiver,
supra note 144, at 313-15. But see R. Craig Kitchen, Negative Lawmaking Delegations:
Constitutional Structure and Delegations to the Executive of Discretionary Authority to Amend,
Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (2013) ("[M]any, if not
most, negative lawmaking delegations are unconstitutional because they undermine a key
structural purpose of Article I, Section 7.").
148 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
149 Id.
15o Id.; see also supra Part III.
1 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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contemporary imponderables." 52 1In other words, the permissibility of
enforcement discretion will vary not only with the construction of particular
statutes, but also with factual and political context. 153
Finally, in Category 3, when the President contravenes expressed or
implied Congressional will, the Executive's power is "at its lowest ebb" because
"he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter."' 54 Only "conclusive and preclusive"
Presidential exercises of power can be sustained in Youngstown's third
category.'15 In the enforcement discretion context, not only does the Executive
retain inherent discretion sufficient to sustain his authority in Category 2, but he
also possesses an irreducible, indefeasible core of discretion in enforcement,
which can sustain at least some discretionary power in Category 3.
There seems to be a narrow consensus, even among scholars who
characterize enforcement discretion as "defeasible by contrary congressional
command," that executive enforcement discretion must be conclusive and
preclusive at least with respect to individual criminal prosecutions in light of the
Pardon Clause.1 56 While the pardon power applies only to criminal prosecution,
the Bill of Attainder Clause indicates that Congress could not constitutionally
invade executive enforcement discretion by requiring enforcement against a
particular individual, even in the civil context. 15 The President's "conclusive
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 638; see, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-95 (2015)
(holding President's formal recognition power is "exclusive").
156 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 105, at 2295; see id. at n.72 (questioning "whether
Congress could, consistent with the constitutional separation of powers, subject the decision not to
prosecute to judicial review for reasons other than selective prosecution"); Price, Enforcement
Discretion, supra note 25, at 711 (acknowledging that "executive enforcement discretion must be
indefeasible" in the "limited" context of declining to prosecute an individual the Executive believes
to be factually innocent).
157 Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 711; cf Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438, 441 (1992) (distinguishing Klein and holding Northwest Timber
Compromise only "compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law" and therefore
did not violate separation of powers); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) (holding
"legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases
pending before it"). The Supreme Court revisited these issues in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, which
presented the question whether 22 U.S.C. § 8772 violated the separation of powers. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2015) (No. 14-770), 2014
WL 7463968, at *2-3. Section 8772 directed that assets in a particular case before the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York "shall be subject to execution" upon two
findings of fact. See id. at i. The Supreme Court distinguished Klein and held that this law did "not
offend 'separation of powers principles . . .protecting the role of the independent Judiciary within
the constitutional design."' Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324, 1329 (2016) (quoting
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000)).
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and preclusive" enforcement discretion in Category 3, however, extends beyond
the prohibition on Bills of Attainder. Though Congress can always "enact
statutory guidelines for enforcement discretion," it is not clear that Congress
could constitutionally compel prosecution under specific conditions.1"s Such a
congressional encroachment into the Executive's enforcement discretion might
impermissibly impinge on the Executive's power, grounded in Article II, to
"coordinate and prioritize enforcement."l5
Given the traditional judicial deference to executive exercises of
enforcement discretion,1 60 it is unsurprising that courts have been relatively
"silent when it comes to the constitutional implications of a president's decision
not to enforce a law."1 6 1 If a court were to rule on the scope of permissible
executive discretion in Category 3,162 the court should construe Congressional
incursions into the executive's inherent enforcement discretion strictly. In light
of the Article II concerns about the President's power and obligation to supervise,
coordinate, and prioritize enforcement, coupled with the "due process as
separation of powers" concerns about protecting individual liberty, courts should
require that Congress speak clearly before they find executive enforcement
discretion precluded in Category 3.163
This is not to say that the Executive is inherently empowered to
categorically, prospectively, and affirmatively refuse to enforce laws based on
158 Compare Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 712 ("Congress ... might even
specify conditions under which prosecution would be mandatory, provided the executive branch
believed a provable legal violation occurred."), with In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir.
2013) ("In light of the President's Article II prosecutorial discretion, Congress may not mandate
that the President prosecute a certain kind of offense or offender.") (emphasis omitted).
159 See Andrias, supra note 43, at 1037; Metzger, supra 43, at 1929 ("[P]residential efforts to
direct nonenforcement on a categorical, prospective, and transparent basis can have strong
constitutional roots."); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 484 (2010) ("The President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he
cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them."); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831-32 (1985) (discussing complicated balancing process in setting agency enforcement
priorities).
160 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834 (establishing "general presumption of unreviewability of decisions
not to enforce"); see generally Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done:
An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253, 288 (2003) (discussing judicial review of agency inaction).
161 Love & Garg, supra note 25, at 1207.
162 But see Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 25, at 1573 (proposing application of political
question doctrine to executive enforcement discretion in light of the "practical and institutional
challenges in [judicially] ensuring faithful execution of prohibitory statutes by enforcement
officials").
163 Cf Big Waiver, supra note 144, at 322 (discussing normative desirability of "clear statement
rule for recognizing the existence of a big waiver authority").
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policy preferences." Instead, it is simply to say that courts should not find that
the Executive has "abdicat[ed] its statutory responsibilities," thus exceeding even
its conclusive and preclusive enforcement discretion in Category 3, without at
least a clear statement of Congress's preferred enforcement priorities."' This
clear statement rule should apply even to category-wide enforcement
prioritization decisions, especially where the Executive has articulated a
"reasonable basis in law" for its categorical prioritization.16 6
V. WHAT YOUNGSTOWN CAN TEACH Us ABOUT DAPA AND DACA
Although Youngstown alone does not conclusively resolve the states'
Take Care Clause argument against the constitutionality of DAPA, it aids in
elucidating and isolating the issues, ultimately demonstrating the tenuous nature
of the states' argument in Texas v. United States, as well as the recent allegations
of unconstitutionality by state Attorneys General that prompted the revocation of
DACA. "I First, despite the Fifth Circuit's assertion in its substantive APA
analysis that "DAPA is not authorized by statute," 168 it is not immediately clear
that DAPA falls outside of even Category 1. In its substantive APA analysis, the
Fifth Circuit majority relies primarily on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
canon to argue that the INA expressly precludes DAPA (thus placing the
program in Category 3 as impliedly contrary to Congress's will). 169 This
reasoning is not particularly convincing, however, especially in light of the
extensive history of deferred action practices and the background presumption
164 See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (noting it might exceed agency discretion if "agency
has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an
abdication of its statutory responsibilities") (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162
(D.C. Cir. 1973)); In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("President and federal
agencies may not ignore statutory mandates or prohibitions merely because of policy disagreement
with Congress.") (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993)); Big Waiver, supra note 144,
at 274 ("The general rule regarding the unreviewability of enforcement discretion gives way,
however, when an agency adopts an affirmative policy of not enforcing a statutory requirement.");
Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 760 (describing a categorical, prospective
suspension of statute as presumptively invalid).
165 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
166 See Andrias, supra note 43, at 1117.
167 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
168 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 184 (5th Cir. 2015); see also id. at 186 ("DAPA is
foreclosed by Congress's careful plan; the program is 'manifestly contrary to the statute' and
therefore was properly enjoined.").
169 Id. at 179 (noting that INA provides detailed and specific provisions for determining legal
status, but that DAPA-eligible individuals are "entirely absent from those specific classes"); id. at
215-16 (King, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority analysis as application of expressio unius
canon).
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of Chevron"o deference to reasonable agency interpretations that do not directly
contravene statutory instructions."'
Furthermore, recall that under Youngstown, congressional authorization
in Category 1 may be either "express or implied."l72 There is a strong argument
Congress has "de facto" delegated the authority to implement DAPA to the
Executive by passing a "detailed" immigration code that "mak[es] a huge
fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive."' 73 Even before
DACA and DAPA were implemented, Cox and Rodriguez argued that this de
facto delegation gave the President the power, "without having to resort to the
legislative process, to alter significantly the composition of the immigrant labor
force, to permit immigrants with minor criminal convictions to stay rather than
removing them, and so on."'74 Even Delahunty and Yoo, who argued that DACA
was unconstitutional in 2012, acknowledge the force of this de facto delegation
argument, positing that Congress may have "enabled, and indeed tempted" the
Administration to under-enforce the immigration law, especially given the
Congressional failure to adequately appropriate funds for enforcement.' 7 5
DACA/DAPA, however, is most comfortably located within Category
2. The second category's "zone of twilight" applies only in cases of
congressional silence.17 6 In this particular situation, Congress was apparently
silent on the permissibility of DACA/DAPA, insofar as "[t]here is no provision
in the INA that prohibits the Administration from implementing programs like
DACA."17 7 From this perspective, the explicit grants of discretion in the INA are
170 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (holding
agency's reasonable interpretations of ambiguous organic statute entitled to deference).
171 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (King, J., dissenting) ("[I]n
enacting these provisos, Congress was legislating against a backdrop of longstanding practice of
federal immigration officials exercising ad hoc deferred action.") (emphasis omitted); see also
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 105, at 2310 (noting the "highly contextual nature of the
expressio unius canon's applicability and scope" and explaining that Chevron requires "interpreters
to ask whether a reasonable person reading the words in context would have understood the
specification to be exclusive"). But see Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 111 ("The clash
between DACA's broad relief and the INA's comprehensive scheme thus eliminates the
President's recourse to category one of the Youngstown typology.").
172 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
173 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 463.
174 Id. at 464.
15 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 852-53 (acknowledging that de facto delegation may
be the Administration's best defense of DACA, but proposing de facto delegation may violate
nondelegation doctrine).
176 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (defining Category 2 as "absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority").
177 Wadhia, supra note 30, at 62.
[Vol. 120158
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/6
2017] Executive Enforcement Discretion and the Separation ofPowers
"at the very least" consistent with the relevant factors178 in DACA/DAPA's
deferred action analysis.179 Thus, DACA/DAPA would seem to fit securely
within Category 2.
There is an important counterargument, however, raised by both the
Fifth Circuit and academic commentators, that Category 3, rather than Category
2, should apply. Although DACA/DAPA is not necessarily contrary to
"expressed" congressional will, the failure of the proposed Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors Act ("DREAM Act") might impliedly prohibit
DACA/DAPA, placing the Executive's program in Category 3. s0 In fact,
Youngstown itself presented a somewhat analogous situation:
[T]he use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in
order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by
any congressional enactment [i.e. outside Category 1]; prior to
this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of
settling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley Act was under
consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which
would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of
emergency. 181
In Youngstown, "a decisive majority of five Justices," including Jackson in his
famed concurrence, "treated Congress' silence as speech-its nonenactment of
authorizing legislation as a legally binding expression of intent to forbid the
seizure at issue."l82 Thus, Truman's attempted steel seizure was scrutinized in
Category 3, flouting an implied Congressional prohibition on the President's
action.
This treatment of nonenactment-as-implied-prohibition in Youngstown
is not, however, dispositive of the analysis here. First, as Professor Laurence
Tribe has pointed out, the Court has not always treated congressional silence as
implicit prohibition: in Dames & Moore v. Regan,"' the Court interpreted a
similar instance of Congressional silence as "non-silence," implicitly authorizing
the Executive to suspend a private contractor's claims against the Iranian
178 See supra note 7 (identifying these factors).
179 Wadhia, supra note 30 n.21 (citing Inmmigration Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b
(2012)).
180 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 185 (5th Cir. 2015) ("DAPA is far from interstitial:
Congress has repeatedly declined to enact the [DREAM Act], features of which closely resemble
DACA and DAPA."); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 784 ("[T]he Obama Administration
effectively wrote into law 'the DREAM Act,' whose passage had failed numerous times.").
181 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added).
182 Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax ofthe Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional
and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L. J. 515, 520 (1982).
183 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Government.' 84 Second, and perhaps more importantly, while Congressional
"silence or inaction" may sometimes provide relevant interpretive context, "[n]ot
all silences may legitimately be read as part of statutory context[.]"185
Specifically, it "seems incompatible with our constitutional structure[,]" which
provides expressly defined processes for lawmaking,1 86 to "justify[] an
interpretation of a prior enactment by pointing to what a subsequent Congress
did not enact[.]"l 87 Therefore, the negative implications drawn by the Fifth
Circuit and others from the failure of the DREAM Act is inconsistent with Article
I of the Constitution, which does not contemplate the non-enactment as legally
binding."I From this perspective, DACA is properly located within Youngstown
Category 2, despite the failed enactment of the DREAM Act."8
Although most commentators have failed to apply Youngstown to DAPA
and DACA,1 90 at least one has made an attempt, but then misapplied Category 2.
Peter Margulies argues that "[p]rosecutorial [d]iscretion [c]annot [s]upport
DACA" because, "as historically interpreted[,]" prosecutorial discretion
"provides little or no valid precedent for DACA[.]"l91 He argues that DACA is
unsupportable in Category 2 because "DACA is more expansive than the typical
discretionary regime [and] . . . therefore falls outside any course of dealing in
which Congress has acquiesced."'92 His argument, however, fundamentally
misapplies Category 2. First, Margulies apparently (and unjustifiably) requires a
demonstration of repeated Congressional acquiescence before he would find
184 Tribe, supra note 182, at 526-27.
185 Id. at 529-530.
186 Id. at 530. Tribe and others have referred to lawmaking procedures prescribed by the
Constitution as "due process of lawmaking." See, e.g., id. at 517.
187 Tribe, supra note 182, at 530.
188 Cf Immigration Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 (1983) (holding all
"exercise[s] of legislative power ... [are] subject to the standards prescribed in Art[icle] I"). It is
worth noting Tribe defends Youngstown's result but for a different reason. He embraces Justice
Douglas's concurrence, which interpreted "Congress' silence [to] bar[] the challenged action by
President Truman not because it signal[ed] a desire by Congress that Truman act otherwise, but
because the underlying constitutional rule [of no takings without just compensation] . . . makes the
sort of thing Truman did void absent explicit prior consent by Congress." Tribe, supra note 182,
at 525.
189 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 30, at 279 (arguing DACA belongs in Category 2).
19 But see Gilbert, supra note 30, at 277-82 (applying Youngstown analysis, placing DACA in
Category 2, and positing some inherent Presidential authority over immigration). This paper builds
upon Gilbert's more accurate foundation, which essentially limits its analysis of inherent authority
to the President's immigration powers. In contrast, Parts III and IV of this paper derive a general
executive enforcement discretion power and apply it to DACA/DAPA.
191 Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 122. Margulies later incorporated by reference
the same analysis to conclude that DAPA was also impermissible. See Margulies, Boundaries,
supra note 35, at 1252-54.
192 Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 124.
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Executive action justified in Category 2.1' Not only does this analysis frame the
inquiry at an unnecessarily particularized level of generality (requiring a
demonstrated course of conduct in the immigration context, specifically), but it
also ignores the essential feature of Category 2: concurrent Congressional and
Presidential authority. Margulies simply ignores the possibility that the President
might possess an inherent nonenforcement power in Category 2, which Part III
of this Article derived from constitutional text and structure. 194
A proper application of Category 2 would first recognize that Congress
and the President possess concurrent power to determine the contours of
permissible enforcement discretion.195 Moreover, in Category 2, the "de facto
delegation" rationale retains significance, especially in light of Justice Jackson's
instruction that "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes ... enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility."l96 In the case of DACA/DAPA, congressional gridlock partially
explains the Executive's reliance on enforcement discretion and prioritization to
implement a sensible and workable immigration policy. 197 Given the strong roots
of the Executive's inherent enforcement discretion power in Article II and due
process as separation of powers, there is a compelling argument that
DACA/DAPA is justified in the face of Congressional silence in Category 2,
193 Margulies apparently derives this requirement from Jackson's suggestion that
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes ... enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Notably, this sentence is
phrased in permissive, rather than mandatory, terms; quiescence might be sufficient to indicate
independent executive authority, but it is certainly not necessary.
194 In fact, Margulies does not even acknowledge the possibility of inherent executive power
until he reaches Category 3. See Margulies, Taking Care, supra note 34, at 124. His analysis of
inherent powers, however, again frames the inquiry at an unjustifiably specific level of generality.
He argues because "the President possesses no enumerated powers over immigration[,]" the
Constitution cannot support DACA in Category 3. Id. at 126. Again, the inquiry is too
particularized: Margulies fails to recognize the possibility that more general constitutional
provisions, such as the Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Pardon Clause, the Bill
of Attainder Clause, and the Due Process Clause together support an inference of inherent
executive enforcement discretion. See supra Part III; see also In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d. 255, 262-
63 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
195 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
196 Id. (emphasis added); Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 463-64; see also Gilbert, supra
note 30, at 256 (arguing "DACA was a justifiable assertion of Executive authority in the face of
gridlock in Congress").
19 See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25, at 674 (relying on enforcement discretion
in part because of congressional gridlock); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 784 ("[B]oth of us
favor a speedier path to citizenship for illegal aliens who were brought here as children and are
enrolled in school or serve in the United States Armed Forces.").
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especially in light of the Administration's "reasonable.*. .basis" for its publicly-
articulated enforcement priorities and Congress's inertia.1 98
Finally, assuming arguendo that Congress has in fact impliedly
prohibited the degree of enforcement discretion contemplated in DACA/DAPA,
the Executive's program could still be defended in Category 3. Although "neither
DACA's advocates nor members of the Obama Administration appear to have
relied on this type of 'inherent authority' argument to justify DACA,"' 99 there
are several colorable arguments. First, as Professor Lauren Gilbert has suggested,
the President might retain some inherent authority to "regulate aspects of
immigration, particularly those touching on foreign affairs" in light of the
inherent executive foreign affairs power identified by the Court in United States
v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.200 Notably, the Court has affirmed repeatedly
"that the regulation of immigration implicates the foreign affairs power."201
Moreover, this Article has theorized a generalized inherent executive
power of enforcement discretion, stemming from Article II and the concept of
"due process as separation of powers."202 Part III also suggested that this power
is, at least in some sense, irreducible and indefeasible.2 03 In Category 3, where
Presidential power is at its "lowest ebb," it is obviously difficult to defend any
exercise of Presidential power.2 0 The enforcement discretion argument in
Category 3 loses much of its force outside of the context of individualized
prosecution, where the Pardon Clause grants the President tremendous unilateral
power. 205 DACA/DAPA, however, is an exercise of discretion on a prospective,
categorical basis in the context of civil removal proceedings. Therefore, perhaps
the strongest Category 3 argument in defense of DACA/DAPA relies on the
Executive's supervisory powers under Article II, which encompass an authority
198 Cf Andrias, supra note 43, at 1039. But see Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 25,
at 758-60 (arguing that DACA exceeds permissible bounds of executive enforcement discretion
because it contradicts the statutory policy of the INA).
' Gilbert, supra note 30, at 281.
200 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the
President as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of foreign relations"); Gilbert,
supra note 30, at 281. But see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015)
(explaining "Curtiss-Wright did not hold that the President is free from Congress's lawmaking
power in the field of international relations" and intimating Curtiss-Wright was a Category 1 case);
Gilbert, supra note 30, at 281 (noting Curtiss-Wright "stands on shaky ground" and has been
subject to numerous academic critiques); Shane & Bruff, supra note 38, at 593 (noting Curtiss-
Wright is "ubiquitously cited" for "ambitious claims of [executive foreign] affairs powers[,]" but
that most of its commentary on foreign affairs power appears to be dicta).
201 Gilbert, supra note 30, at 280 n. 142 (collecting cases).
202 See supra Part III.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
204 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
205 See, e.g., In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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to coordinate and prioritize enforcement. 206 On this view, DACA/DAPA might
be able to survive even in Category 3, as long as the Executive can reasonably
defend it as a prioritization program rather than systematic under-enforcement of
the law, which might be contrary to congressional will as expressed through
increased immigration enforcement appropriations.207 Finally, temporarily
putting aside questions of justiciability 2 08 the above-mentioned clear statement
rule against constraints on executive enforcement discretion would favor
upholding DACA/DAPA, where the only evidence of contrary congressional
will is increased appropriationS 209 and negative implications drawn from the
INA. 2 10
VI. CONCLUSION
The Executive's discretion to decline to enforce the law is an under-
theorized area of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The Obama
Administration's publically salient exercises of discretion, from DACA/DAPA
to the abstention from prosecution of certain marijuana crimes, have brought
renewed scholarly attention to the issue. Moreover, a spate of lawsuits against
the Obama Administration, especially in the immigration context, has drawn the
courts into the foray as well. The Fifth Circuit's decision upholding the
preliminary injunction against DACA did not reach the states' constitutional
206 See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 43, at 1045 ("[E]ven when legislation circumscribes
enforcement discretion, the Executive must continue to make countless policy determinations
about how best to enforce other parts of the statutes or to prioritize among various statutory
programs."); Metzger, supra note 43, at 1929 (characterizing DACA and DAPA as "fulfilling
[DHS Secretaries'] constitutional duties to supervise"); see also David A. Martin, A Lawful Step
for the Immigration System, WASH. PosT (June 24, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-24/opinions/35460047_1_deportation-policy-record-
deportations-removals (arguing DACA is lawful, even in light of Congressional enforcement
mandates through appropriations, because "the administration has pledged to stay at the level of
removals that corresponds to appropriations, even while keeping Dreamers off the deportation
list").
207 See Martin, supra note 206. Cf Prakash, Nonenforcement Power, supra note 30, at 116
("The President may be guilty of having the wrong enforcement priorities, but he has not violated
his faithful execution duty.").
208 See, e.g., Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 25, at 1575.
209 Cf Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) ("We recognize that both
substantive enactments and appropriations measures are 'Acts of Congress,' but the latter have the
limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs."). This is not to say that
the Executive could refuse to enforce the INA to the full extent that Congress has chosen to fund
it. See Martin, supra note 206. Instead, it is to argue that as long as DACA/DAPA is framed as an
enforcement prioritization decision, the program is permissible, provided that the immigration laws
are otherwise enforced overall to the fullest extent possible given congressional appropriations.
See id.
210 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
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arguments, and thus the precise contours of the Executive's constitutional
discretion to decline enforcement remain unclear after an equally-divided
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
This Article brings a modicum of clarity to the debate by drawing upon
Justice Jackson's famed Youngstown concurrence. First, Youngstown provides a
common framework that can accommodate the various positions on executive
enforcement discretion, from Delahunty and Yoo's duty-bound Executive, to
Price's more flexible dual-presumption model. Second, this Article
independently contributes a theory of an inherent power of executive
enforcement discretion, grounded in several provisions of the Constitution,
including Article II and the Due Process Clause. With this strong constitutional
grounding, the Executive's inherent enforcement powers can support exercises
of discretion in Category 2 and perhaps even Category 3, especially in the context
of individualized enforcement actions. Finally, this Article demonstrates the
utility of the Youngstown framework in the context of enforcement discretion by
applying its categories systematically to the DACA/DAPA debate, ultimately
concluding that the program is defensible as an exercise of inherent discretion in
Category 2. Given the judicial reluctance to interfere with exercises of executive
discretion, the Fifth Circuit's recent DAPA decision stands out as somewhat of
an outlier. Regardless of one's political affiliation, perhaps one positive
consequence of the states' challenges will be a more sophisticated debate about
the permissibility of executive enforcement discretion. Hopefully, this Article
provides a step in the right direction.
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